Let F be a family of subsets of the ground set [n] = {1, 2, .
Introduction
A fundamental question when analyzing a voting method is what is the distribution of power among the voters. The most common measure of power, the Banzhaf index, quantifies the percentage of power of a voter by its ability to alter the outcome, i.e., the probability that if that voter were to change its vote, the outcome would change. There are numerous theorems that show how to compute the Banzhaf index in various circumstances. This paper will be about the inverse problem: if we fix a vector of prospective percentages of power, can we find a voting method which will give us a good approximation to those desired powers ?
The problem of designing a voting system to achieve a certain distribution of power is not a purely theoretical one. In New York State there are a number of counties whose governmental structure is produced in just this way. Each town in the county is assigned a representative, but that representative is assigned a weighted vote in such a way that the representative's Banzhaf index is close to the percentage of the population of the county living in the particular town. These computations are re-done every ten years after the official census of the county is taken.
Surprisingly, there is little research on how to accomplish this task. Aziz, Paterson and Leech [1] discuss an iterative algorithm which seems to work well in practice, but there is a fundamental problem in analyzing it fully. There are no results about how well one can approximate a given vector. Without some sort of bound on the possibilities, it is hard to know when an iterative algorithm has converged sufficiently.
When the number of voters is small, it is clear that one can not closely approximate every power vector. There are just not enough different voting games to get close to every vector. But, one might think that as the number of voters increases one can closely approximate every vector. In this paper our focus will be on those vectors where the power is concentrated mainly on some strict subset of the voters, say k out of n. We will show that if the power is concentrated on only k of the n voters, then it can not be closely approximated unless it is essentially the power vector of a voting game with only k voters.
The Banzhaf index is usually defined in terms of a simple voting game. We will adopt a somewhat more general setting here. For positive integers k < n, let [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and (k, n] = {k + 1, . . . , n}. For a set X, let 2 X denote the family of all subsets of X. Let F be a family of subsets of [n] .
be the number of pairs of subsets of [n] that differ in one element, so that exactly one of them
. F is called a simplicial complex if it is closed under taking subsets, that is, if for every B ⊆ A ∈ F, B ∈ F. The members of [n] are the vertices of the complex, and it is an n-complex if their number is n. We should note that a simplicial complex is equivalent to the collection of losing coalitions in a simple voting game. See [3, Chapter 2] .
For a simplicial n-complex F with p(F) > 0, the (normalized) Banzhaf vector of F, denoted B(F), is the vector (B(F, 1), B(F, 2), . . . , B(F, n)), where B(
, F A is either empty or equal to the family of all subsets of (k, n].
a complex. Moreover, in this case the vector consisting of the first k coordinates of B(F) is equal to B(G), and the last n − k coordinates of B(F) vanish. Our main result is the following theorem, that shows that if almost all the weight of a Banzhaf vector of an n-complex is concentrated in k coordinates, then its Banzhaf vector is close to a Banzhaf vector of a k-pure complex.
be a positive real, and let F ⊆ 2 [n] be an n-complex. If n i=k+1 B(F, i) ≤ , then there exists a k-pure n-complex F so that
This shows that the significant part of the Banzhaf vector of any n-complex in which most of the weight is concentrated in the first k coordinates is essentially equal to the Banzhaf vector of a k-complex. Thus, for example, for k = 2 and = 0.01, the theorem implies that if for an n-complex F, 
The proof
In this section we present the proof of the main result. The basic idea is to show that if almost all weight of the Banzhaf vector is concentrated in the first k coordinates, then it is possible to add or delete a relatively small number of sets to the complex to get a k-pure complex. The result follows by showing that such a small number of modifications cannot change the Banzhaf vector significantly. We proceed with the details.
Proof of Theorem 1.1: Let F ⊆ 2
[n] be an n-complex, and assume that
Note that, by definition, for every i, k
By the well-known edge-isoperimetric inequality for the cube (see [4] , [2] , [5] ), for every family H ⊆ 2
[n] , p(H) ≥ |H|(n − log 2 |H|).
In particular, if |H| ≤ 2 n−1 , p(H) ≥ |H|. Since one of H and H, the complement of H, has less than half of all possible subsets and p(H) = p(H), it follows that
Combining (1) and (2), and applying (3) to each of the (n − k)-complexes F A , we conclude that
Let F ⊆ 2
[n] be the family obtained from F by defining, for every
and it is obviously k-pure. By (4), the complex F is obtained from F by removing or adding at most p(F) sets. Observe that, crucially, for every fixed i, the quantity p(F, i) can change by at most 1 with the addition or deletion of a single set to F. It thus follows that for each i,
By summing over all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and by noting that for each i ≥ k + 1, p(F , i) = 0 and that n i=k+1 p(F, i) ≤ p(F) this implies that
Note, in particular, that since < 1 k+1 this implies that p(F ) > 0, showing that F cannot be the complex of all sets or the empty complex.
It remains to show that the last two inequalities imply that the two vectors B(F ) and B(F) are close to each other in the 1 -norm. Indeed, by the above inequalities, for every i,
and thus
Summing (5) over all 1 ≤ i ≤ k, and using the fact that
.
+ , completing the proof.
Concluding remarks
We have seen that some vectors of distribution of power cannot be approximated well by Banzhaf vectors of simplicial complexes. In some voting schemes, the voters are distributed into regions, and we may be interested in the distribution of power among the regions, rather than among the individual voters. In the next simple proposition we observe that if every region is large, we can always approximate well any distribution of power among the regions. 
there is a simplicial n-complex F so that for
Let R i be an arbitrary subset of cardinality t i of N i , which will be called the set of representatives of N i . The set R = ∪ r i=1 R i is the set of all representatives. The complex F consists of all subsets of [n] that contain at most t/2 elements of R. (In fact, any symmetric condition on the set of representatives will do, for example, containing no representative at all, or containing at most t/3 representatives). By symmetry, each element j ∈ R has the same Banzhaf index p(F, j), while clearly for each j ∈ [n] − R, p(F, j) = 0. It follows that for each i, B i =
< r , and completing the proof. Note that by our main result, in order to achieve a good approximation for any desired distribution of powers, we sometimes need large sets of representatives for each region; if each region is only allowed to have a single representative and all the power is distributed among them, then some vectors will not admit good approximations, even if the number of regions is large.
This paper begins the study of what vectors in the standard simplex can be closely approximated by Banzhaf vectors of simplicial complexes. We have shown that vectors in which most weight is concentrated in a small number of coordinates can only be closely approximated if they are essentially the Banzhaf vectors of complexes on a smaller ground set. However, we still know little of how the Banzhaf vectors are distributed throughout the simplex. The technique used in this paper looks to be inapplicable to that more general question.
